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  Intergovernmental cooperation is an important topic in Michigan’s current 
economic climate and has received a lot of treatment by researchers.  However, very few 
studies have been conducted regarding cost sharing agreements made by cooperating 
groups, especially in the realm of fire service.  This study identifies common cost 
allocation mechanisms and develops a conceptual framework that predicts prevalent 
patterns between low transaction cost sharing arrangements and similarities among 
involved communities.  Other theories are presented regarding patterns with expenditures 
and other budgetary data.  Patterns were identified using two-step cluster analysis in 
SPSS.  Three tests were done uncovering several variables significant in determining 
clusters.  Among these variables were cost allocation choice, total expenditures, number 
participating municipalities per fire district, median home value, and percent white 
population.  There were several limitations to this study, including a small number of 
observations and limited variables. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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  v1. Introduction 
  Intergovernmental cooperation is an increasingly important issue in Michigan due 
to the state’s struggling economic climate.  Municipalities are faced with shrinking 
budgets and growing expenses.  It is common for cities, townships, and villages to spend 
up to or more than fifty percent of their annual budgets on emergency services such as 
fire, police, ambulance and support services such as dispatch centers.  Michigan’s 
municipalities are faced with the choice of cutting public services, impending 
bankruptcy, or finding mutually beneficial cooperative service contracts with neighbors.  
The third option has been shown to decrease the financial burdens of public services on 
municipal budgets while sometimes increasing service quality. 
  Intergovernmental cooperation is generally seen by most groups and individuals 
involved in policy making as a beneficial endeavor however, as Gerber and Gibson 
(2005) point out, the policies imposed in the Great Lake states, including Michigan, 
create  “a challenging environment for voluntary regional cooperation, since state 
governments have, to date, taken a very limited role in mandating or encouraging 
regional governance; regional entities therefore have few means for offsetting local 
government disincentives and encouraging regional cooperation” (Gerber and Gibson 
2005, 14).  While this may be true, Michigan policies over the last half-century have 
begun to break down many of the legal impediments to ease collaboration among 
government services in which economies of scale may be the greatest.  The Police and 
Fire Protection Act of 1951 focusing on municipalities with populations of less than 
15,000 and the Emergency Services Act of 1988 are great examples of the legislature 
taking an active role in easing the ability of municipalities to work together.  As a result, 
  1Michigan boasts up to 65 taxing fire districts that have filed independent audits with the 
state treasurer, though the US Census of Governments only recognizes four districts by 
their definition.  Over 120 cooperative groups have been identified in Michigan, and all 
but a handful have shown activity within the last two years indicating over 100 active 
interlocal fire agreements today
1. 
Fire service is particularly expensive because it is capital intensive.  Fires are 
infrequent, unpredictable, and their incidence in the United States has been declining over 
the last few decades, yet fire departments are typically fully staffed at a level capable of 
combating serious structural fires.  Additionally, fire service faces a peak load problem 
that translates into excess capacity during downtimes (Scorsone 2006).  These issues 
translate into higher costs for cities and tax payers.  One strategy, which has been used in 
recent years to alleviate these problems, is to cross train firefighters as emergency 
medical personnel and paramedics.  Despite these improvements in capabilities, cities are 
not receiving the cost reductions that they had hoped.  Thus, fire service consolidation is 
an attractive option that offers potentially vast savings.   
Cooperation can range in degree from basic equipment sharing, informal or 
formal mutual aid agreements, to a functional consolidation of shared central dispatch 
services, equipment, training resources, and joint purchasing efforts.  The most extreme 
option, which also has the largest potential economies, is the full consolidation of 
departments into a single entity, which in Michigan is called an authority under PA 57 of 
1988.  As the extremity of departmental integration increases, the more difficult 
                                                 
1 The number of active interlocal agreements comes from the independent annual audits submitted to the 
Department of Treasury in 2005 or 2006.  The audits list any fire departments with which they are 
collaborating but the degree of cooperation for all cases is either unknown, vague, or has been formally 
filed with the Office of the Great Seal under PA 57 or PA 7.  
  2contractual negotiations become, yet the potential for savings is typically greatest with 
full consolidation. 
  The phenomenon of why governmental entities come together, who is most likely 
to cooperate, and where they can find the most savings has been thoroughly explored to 
date.  Researchers generally find that a desire to cooperate is derived from financial 
necessity or the inability to meet service demand and those communities which have the 
most in common are more likely to participate with one another.  However, the specifics 
of the agreements made by those cooperating organizations have received little treatment, 
especially in fire service.  The issues regarding cost allocation decisions are incredibly 
important since they may directly lead to the economies or diseconomies achieved by the 
participants.  Thus many issues need to be explored.  For example, when cooperating fire 
departments realize economies of scale are the reduced costs allocated among all the 
parties?  Does each party receive an equal share of the cost savings?  If one department 
brings more to the agreement in terms of apparatus or other equipment, thus lowering the 
total future expenditures required from the group, are they then rewarded by paying a 
smaller share of the costs?   
This thesis examines the second stage of the collaborative process by looking only 
at those groups that have already agreed to work together, and then have formed an 
agreement about how costs will be shared.  It intends to find patterns among social, 
political, geographical and economic variables likely to be related to a certain type of cost 
allocation agreement.  Based on past work, it is expected that communities that share a 
greater number of similar characteristics are more likely to reach cost allocation 
agreements that are less costly to negotiate and implement by each participating 
  3municipality.  In other words, communities that share a greater number of similar 
characteristics will more often be associated with cost allocation agreements that have 
lower transactions costs than those who are more dissimilar. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There are two main financial issues associated with fire department consolidation: 
economies of scale and transaction costs.  Economies of scale occur when the cost of 
servicing the next unit declines.  In fire service, economies of scale can be realized by 
spreading out the costs of apparatus and personnel over a larger service area. 
Consequently, by sharing assets and resources and expanding the service area, 
departments can see cost savings without sacrificing service quality. 
Depending on the degree of integration, cooperation can lead to greater efficiency 
and quality of service.  Fixed costs are a major factor in department budgets because of 
excessive equipment and personnel requirements.  Fire stations need to be manned 
twenty-four hours a day, 365 days per year, resulting in higher personnel costs than most 
businesses.  Additionally, each station needs to be equipped with fire equipment, such as 
hoses and trucks.  Economies of scale can be realized by sharing equipment among a 
larger service area, reducing the total number of firehouses, or by placing them in more 
efficient locations, providing joint training, creating a central call station, and utilizing 
excess labor during downtimes. 
While economies of scale are usually viewed positively, institutional economists 
recognize that there are consequences of these budgetary benefits.  While the service may 
be more efficient with shorter response times, consumers of the fire service have only one 
  4type of service from which to choose.  The lack of variety is the result of lower prices 
(Schmid 2004).  This uniform service is most obvious in the form of fire fighter training.  
Instead of having a variety of resources to draw from, the fire district area has 
homogenous protection ability.  Institutionalists also acknowledge the difficulty in 
determining cost allocation strategies.  Economies of scale results in constant or falling 
marginal costs and the allocation of the fixed costs is particularly difficult (Schmid 2004).  
The demise of many cooperative efforts has come from the inability to correctly allocate 
fixed costs tending to place more financial strain on one party. 
  Institutional economists also offer two types of transaction costs relevant to cost 
allocation negotiations.  The first is fundamental uncertainty, which is the uncertainty in 
predicting the future (Schmid 2004).  Risk is an issue in cost negotiations especially in 
fiscally volatile times.  Decisions may be harder to reach if each party is trying to ensure 
they are protected from any current or future risks.  The second relevant transaction costs 
are contractual, which are critical to this particular study.  These include decision-making 
costs such as the opportunity cost of time and expenses incurred in meetings to negotiate 
contracts (Harvey 2003).  As both the number of parties and complexity of the agreement 
increase so do the costs of transaction (Schmid 2004). 
  Another issue with fire service is the difficulty in identifying the user of the good.  
Because of this, fire protection is a high exclusion cost good; free riders, or nonpaying 
users, are difficult to exclude from the service.  The mere existence of a fire department 
and joint emergency services benefit the entire community, yet under certain cost 
allocation methodologies it is not possible to charge service fees to everyone
2 (Schmid 
                                                 
2 An example of this is when costs are apportioned by usage.   While one city or township may require 
more runs than another, all the other municipalities benefit.  However, they are not charged for the benefits 
  52004).  Consequently, when localities come together to form an interlocal agreement, 
exact costs and users of service are not easily identified.  Fixed costs are particularly hard 
to allocate and fire departments are faced with high fixed equipment expenditures.  Thus, 
it is important in negotiations to ensure that the buyer of the service is not subsidizing the 
seller, or vice versa, in order for economies of scale to be realized. 
 
2.1 Determinants of Cooperation and Empirical Work 
The topic of intergovernmental cooperation determinants has been thoroughly 
researched to date. Most studies agree to the same factors but often have different names 
for the same terms. General determinants of a positive agreement are a smaller number of 
participants, higher number of previously shared activities, rurality, low ratio of elected 
to appointed officials, excess demand due to deficient service provision, rapid expansion 
and creation of needed services from growth, and homogeneity in demand factors as well 
as economic, political and social factors among participating localities (Olson 1966; 
Gerber and Gibson 2005; Feiock 2007; Krueger and McGuire 2005).  Other research on 
determinants of intergovernmental cooperation finds that those jurisdictions with less 
restrictive laws regarding cooperation are most likely to come to formal agreements 
(Feiock, 2007; Gerber and Gibson 2005).   
Political determinants of intergovernmental cooperation include factors such as 
the level of member support required to approve plans, rules regarding ease of vetoes or 
decision challenges, and other governance and legal issues (Gerber and Gibson 2005). 
Local actors often put more weight on political costs than potential economic savings.  
                                                                                                                                                 
they receive as potential users.  This concept may be more obvious in police protection.  The existence of a 
police department protects the whole community through preventative measures and their presence in high 
crime neighborhoods. 
  6The current political climate, both local and federal, as well as the type of cooperative 
activity proposed and regional demand and supply for those services heavily influence 
perceived political costs (Gerber and Gibson 2005; Feiock 2007).  Political transaction 
costs from structure, power distribution, and security during negotiations between public 
officials and other agents involved have also been proposed to have an inverse 
relationship with cooperation. 
Many researchers agree that service measurability, ability to measure the quality 
and output of the service, is important in determining the likelihood of an interlocal 
agreement (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Feiock, 2007).  Based on a survey of randomly 
selected mayors and city managers from around the country, Brown and Potoski created a 
scale of measurability ranging from 1 to 5 (2003).  Of sixty four services, on average 
rating 2.69, fire prevention/suppression was rated 3.24, where a score of 1 represented an 
easily measured service, 3 moderately difficult, and 5, highly difficult.  Thus, fire service 
is perceived as being more difficult to measure than the average public service. 
  There is another branch of literature that correlates service cooperation to 
transaction costs.  A paper by Brown and Potoski (2003) found that transaction cost risks 
are key to a government’s decision to collaborate in public service offerings.   
Intergovernmental cooperation or joint contracting, where full information exists, is a 
way to alleviate contact risks and high transaction costs in fire service provision. 
Congruent with their theory, the institution of city managers and single-member districts 
reduce transaction costs in cooperative agreements.  Institutional variables such as the 
existence of a city manager over a mayor and a higher proportion of single member 
districts versus at-large districts are positively correlated with the decision to engage in a 
  7collaborative venture.  Municipalities with a city manager are 5.3 percent more likely to 
engage in interlocal cooperation. The authors of this study speculate that city managers 
“are more likely to limit the impact of rent seekers and find common ground among 
competitors in interlocal cooperation” (Krueger and McGuire 2005, 27). 
  Other empirical studies that seek to discover benefits of fire protection 
cooperation have found little evidence of economies of scale.  Three different studies 
have found that economies exist in cities with populations under 10,000, 100,000, or 
300,000 with larger cities showing proof of diseconomies (Doeksen and Peterson 1987).  
Other studies of larger U.S. cities (greater than 25,000 populations) found that fiscal 
pressure is not a statistically significant variable in contracting considerations whereas 
cost factors and political influences are significant (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991).  It has 
also been demonstrated that private firms may provide fire service at a lower cost than 
public fire protection (Doeksen and Peterson 1987). 
 
 2.2 Cost Allocation Agreements (i.e. cost sharing mechanisms) 
To date, fire service consolidation studies have looked mostly at the determinants 
of intergovernmental cooperation decisions, existence of economies of scale or changes 
in the quality of services provided.    Scorsone and Martin (2006) researched the impact 
of cost allocation formulas among 24 cooperative fire departments in Michigan.  Using 
data from political, financial, and organizational characteristics of the entities involved in 
the study, the authors sought to determine patterns of choice among cost allocation 
mechanisms.  Focusing on community characteristics, specifically population and SEV, 
they tested correlation with cost sharing allocation choice, either equal or usage based.  
  8Through various testing, they found evidence of a correlation between these variables.  
However, due to limited data and a constrained model, their analysis deserves further 
study to determine conclusive results. 
  Cost allocation studies have been conducted in other industries that share 
common features with fire protection.  The electric industry suffers from the task of 
allocating cost via electric rates but faces similar problems as fire departments in doing so 
because it is largely capital intensive and has peak load problems.  Additionally, some 
types of electric services, like fire services, can be traced in a direct way to a consumer 
and the loss or gain of a consumer does not correspond with a proportional decrease or 
increase in cost.  Because of these issues, there are some researchers who believe that 
cost allocation, whether fixed or proportional to usage, does not effectively distribute 
costs (Kelly 2004; Sunder 1983).  One argument against the reliability of cost sharing 
strategies is that, “fully allocated cost methodologies do not yield reliable information 
about whether it is worthwhile for a business and for society to produce another unit of 
output given the prevailing price for that output.  They provide cost estimates that reflect 
opportunity cost…to produce more or less of a particular good” (Kelly 2004, 22)
3. 
  There have been other studies regarding cooperation among electric utility 
companies where cooperative groups are referred to as power pools.  These power pools 
typically share in the activities of electricity generation and transmission and cost studies 
mainly focus on allocating fixed costs.  These studies have revealed that across different 
cost sharing options, total electricity prices and customer payments vary widely 
suggesting that no method accurately distributes cost shares.  In 1996, one researcher 
                                                 
3 In his article, Kelly focuses on the futility of cost allocation strategies in the electric industries.  However, 
he does point out that his theory applies to all industries, “regardless of whether the common cost is a sheep 
or a 500-MW power plant” (22). 
  9wrote, “Designing a cost allocation rule which encompasses both the complexities of 
power transmission business and the economic and regulation requirements is a topic still 
open to much discussion” (Marangon Lima, 1413).  The problem of designing a cost 
allocation mechanism among governmental units is also undecided.  While the topic of 
fixed cost distribution among power pools is widely discussed in the literature, there has 
been little consideration of this same issue across fixed cost intensive governmental 
service units. 
   
3. Michigan’s Rules 
  There are many laws in Michigan that facilitate and may even encourage 
intergovernmental cooperation.  Public Act (PA) 57 of 1988, the Emergency Services to 
Municipalities Act, allows two or more municipalities to incorporate for the purpose of 
providing emergency services and to levy property taxes to fund the authority.   
Authorities must include the entire area of the municipality incorporated under this act.  
The Office of the Great Seal shows that twenty-five fire authorities have been 
incorporated under this act since 1988.  The records, however, do not show whether these 
groups are still currently active.  
  There are four relevant acts regarding the issue of fire cooperation in Michigan.  
The Urban Cooperation Act of 1967, PA 7, allows for interlocal public agency 
agreements and for certain tax revenues to be received as revenues by the agreements.  
The act requires that these agreements be publicly filed.  Similarly, PA 8 of 1967, the 
Intergovernmental Transfers of Functions and Responsibilities, allows two or more 
political entities to enter into a contract in which they are able to transfer functions or 
  10responsibilities, with certain limitations.  The act also allows for creation of a separate 
administration to oversee implementation of the agreement.  The Office of the Great Seal 
as well as self-reporting data show that about twenty-eight fire groups have cooperated 
under the statutes provided by PA 7. 
  PA 33, the Police and Fire Protection Act of 1951 is a tool for fire cooperation for 
cities, villages, and townships with populations less than or equal to 15,000.  This act 
allows for joint purchasing of equipment, charging and collection of fees for these 
purchases, and creation of special assessment districts and administrative boards.  In our 
comprehensive database, we have five fire groups which are cooperating under PA 33.  In 
this case, data from the Office of the Great Seal were unavailable so these figures are 
based on self-reporting information from annual fire audits.  Since most of the 
agreements we found had an average population under 15,000, we can probably assume 
that many more than five groups are taking advantage of this statutes. 
 
4. Common Cost Allocation Choices 
  In order for cooperation to occur among fire departments, costs must be allocated 
such that municipalities can reach an agreement while maintaining fiscal benefits in each 
area.  Cost allocation is challenging for many reasons.  First, cooperating units need to 
decide which factors are most important in determining an equitable cost formula.   
Municipalities that are similar in size, population, SEV, and number of residential 
dwellings are less likely to encounter problems distributing costs.  However, when 
municipalities differ greatly in characteristics, then it is more difficult to determine a 
  11formula that will charge each unit according to the actual cost they elicit, making one unit 
is subside another. 
  Secondly, both fixed and variable costs must be accounted for in the cost 
allocation formulas to ensure savings for all units.  Fixed costs are often difficult to 
allocate for many reasons.  First, many units bring physical capital with them when they 
merge but the buyer of the services often only pays for incremental variable costs.  While 
variable costs are easier to calculate and allocate, omission of fixed costs in cooperation 
agreements often leads to the financial demise of one or more of the cooperators.   
Additionally, capital purchases often have more accounting requirements, such as 
depreciation and loan interest, which is difficult to distribute in a cost agreement. 
There are many methodologies for cost allocation in interlocal agreements.  The 
most common methods, at least in Michigan, include annual subscription fee, run 
charges, percentage usage share, SEV share, and weighted formulas.  Many cooperative 
efforts rely on a combination of the above strategies, such as an annual subscription fee 
plus run charges. 
 
4.1 Weighted Formula 
  The weighted formula method allocates costs based on the share of certain factors 
of each locality.  Common factors include population, SEV, and historical service usage.  
The formula can be updated annually or as often as new statistics are available.  This 
formula is popular since many qualitative factors are implicitly included.  Population may 
reflect the demand for fire service in each area and has a positive correlation with fire 
runs or historical usage.  SEV takes into consideration increased demand for fire service 
  12associated with higher valued properties.  Persons with more valuable property are 
willing to pay more to protect it.  Other advantages of the weighted formula are that it 
more accurately reflects benefits and costs, reduces uncertainty, is flexible and allows for 
changes in communities over time.  Further, the process of agreeing to the weights in the 
formula increases the transaction costs of this strategy. 
 
4.2 Run Charge 
  Choosing to share costs, based on run charges, requires that the group establish a 
cost per run rate by dividing the total costs of fire protection by the total number of runs.  
This is usually calculated from the previous year’s data and can be updated annually as 
costs rise due to inflation.  This method of cost allocation is simple to calculate and to 
implement but it treats all fire runs equally in terms of cost whether the run required 
above average equipment and services (such as a HAZMAT team) or was an average fire 
run.  Additionally, if the number of runs varies from year to year the seller of the fire 
service may be left to cover remaining costs as well as any fixed costs that were not 
adequately incorporated into the budget (MSA 2005). 
 
4.3 Subscription Fee 
  With this cost allocation method, the buyer of service pays a fixed annual sum to 
the seller for fire protection.  No other variable costs are added based on usage later, 
which may be detrimental to the seller if they underestimated costs when fixing the price 
of the service.  This method is not common because fire service may be unpredictable 
from one year to the next but it does provide the seller with budget certainty.  Further, 
  13since the subscription fee must be uniform, it acts as a regressive tax, leaving low income 
households with a much higher burden.  More commonly, this method is combined with 
run charges to help eliminate any risk of variation from year to year. 
 
4.4 Percent Usage Share 
   Percent usage share uses the total fire personnel hours for each city or township 
as a percent of the total personnel hours from the previous year.  This carefully considers 
the difference in cost between various types of fire service.  For example, it would charge 
more for a fire run that is in an outlying area and less for smaller, more controllable fires 
that use fewer resources such as garbage fires (MSA 2005).  However, it is difficult to 
distribute fair portions of fixed costs using this strategy and it also heavily relies on 
dependable cost and personnel data.  Surveys on service measurability have found that 
fire service output is generally considered difficult to measure which may lead to 
unreliable computations and cost distributions (Brown and Potoski, 2003).  
 
4.5 State Equalized Value Share (SEV) 
Cost sharing using SEV is based on the assumption that the demand for fire 
service is a function of property values.  Collaborations that incorporate this sharing 
strategy usually levy equal millages on local SEVs, a strategy that is easily integrated into 
communities that have already levied special millages for fire protection previous to the 
cooperation agreement (MSA 2005).  Since SEVs tend to vary little from year to year, 
this strategy reduces uncertainty in the fire provision budget. 
 
  14Table 1. Summary of Cost Allocation Methods 
Method Pros  Cons 
Weighted Formula 
May reduce uncertainty and the 
probability of one group paying 
for another 
Tends to be more complex and 
information may be difficult to 
gather 
Run Charge  Simple to calculate if data are 
readily available 
May not accurately distribute 
costs 
Subscription Fee  Creates budget certainty 
All variable costs must be 
estimated prior and with the 
chance that they may not be 
covered by the fee 
Percent Usage  Better reflects costs of service  Difficult to incorporate fixed 
costs 
SEV Share  Easily implemented and reduces 
budget uncertainty 
May not accurately distribute 
costs by usage and need 
 
4.6 Examples 
In 1995, Plymouth Township and the City of Plymouth fully consolidated their 
fire services into one joint department.  The agreement provided for the city to contract 
with the township, with the equity ownership being divided such that the township has 
75% and the city 25%.  They used a weighted formula to allocate costs with equal weight 
on SEV, population, and runs, with a stipulation that the city’s share is never less than 
25%.  As a result of the merger, a projected $6 million was saved over the 10-year 
contract.  The joint department also increased its accessibility to all areas, reduced 
response time in the township’s western side, and found that firefighter performance and 
safety had improved. 
  In 2002, after five years of planning and negotiations, the Howell Area Fire 
Authority was formed under PA 57 of 1988, consisting of the City of Howell, and 
Townships of Genoa, Howell, Marion, Oceola, and Cochoctah.  The city and townships 
had previously worked together under an arrangement in which the city covered 51% of 
the operating budget and the townships shared the remaining 49%.  In 2003, the authority 
  15passed a millage that covers all the expenses of the new fire department, eliminating the 
need for a cost allocation formula among the participants. 
 
5. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this topic has not been thoroughly developed in 
intergovernmental research.  The hypothesis regarding cost allocation strategies is that 
communities which share similarities in fire service demand characteristics are more 
likely to be involved in an equal cost sharing formula or any mechanism with an 
inherently low transaction cost (Scorsone and Martin 2005).  The determinants of fire 
service demand are broad, varied and could logically include most municipal 
characteristics. Similar to cooperation, when municipalities share commonalities among 
determinants, transaction costs decline, raising the inevitability of a positive outcome.  
When negotiating cost allocations, similar municipalities will choose to keep transaction 
costs low and opt for the ease of equal cost sharing.  When factors differ, municipalities 
may fear the possibility of paying a larger portion of the costs and subsidizing fire 
service.  It is these fears that would lead to other usage or size based cost allocation 
formulas.  
Theoretically, weighted formulas help distribute the burden of costs to those who 
incur the greatest costs. However, as discussed above, there is no optimal cost allocation 
formula, and there may be no methodology that accurately distributes a cost to its correct 
source.  As a result, the main theory of cost allocation formula adoption is that weighted 
cost sharing formulas and other non-equal methodologies increase transaction costs.   
Therefore, only municipalities which have an incentive to annually reallocate costs or 
  16determine a fair weighted formula (i.e. a department in which the benefits of negotiation 
outweigh the costs) will choose a cost sharing arrangement associated with higher 
transaction costs.  Municipalities that have less in common are more likely to realize 
fiscal benefits as transaction costs rise.  Similarities in demand determining 
characteristics will help ensure power and information symmetries and lessen the 
likelihood of a buyer or seller of public service subsidizing another user.  In other words, 
since similar communities will not see a large difference in the amount paid to the 
cooperative fire department as they move from a low transaction cost agreement to a 
higher one, they are more likely to adopt lower transaction cost formulas; the benefits of 
low transaction cost agreements outweigh the cost of higher transaction cost ones.  
There are two datasets that are referred to throughout this paper.  The first is a 
comprehensive dataset that includes all of the known fire cooperatives throughout the 
state, totaling 126, as well as all the data available regarding their cost allocation structure 
and vote sharing methods.  I used this database to collect the average of certain variables 
and used that information to fill in missing data into the other smaller dataset which was 
used for testing.  The smaller dataset of 55 fire cooperatives includes those from the 
comprehensive dataset that were started after 1990, had cost allocation information, and 
were testable
4. 
                                                 
4 The dataset was selected to only contain fire groups that began after 1990 because of the time constraints 
in finding data for those beginning prior to that date.  As mentioned earlier, data from the US Census prior 
to the year of initiation was used to gather the majority of the data with the exception of budgetary and 
SEV data.  Finding data for the 1980 Census for each of the appropriate groups would have been beneficial 
if a time were not a constraint. 
There were approximately five fire authorities that had to be eliminated from the dataset because they were 
“untestable”.  I used the coefficient of variation for the SEV data and the Census information in order to be 
able to compare the values despite the various means.  Untestable groups were those that only included one 
non-Village participating entity, where data were not available for Villages.  Thus, the coefficient of 
variation could not be calculated with comparative significance for these groups leading to their elimination 
from the dataset and their classification of untestable. 
  175.1 Cost Allocation 
  The database consists of four types of cost allocation choices: equal, property 
value share, fire runs, and a weighted formula.  This list is also ranked in order of 
contractual costs, with an equal formula implying the least costly sharing method and the 
weighted formula requiring the highest negotiation investment.  An equal cost allocation 
formula implies that the group has decided that each municipality contributes the same 
nominal amount.  For example, the Tri-City Fire Department in Oakland County, which 
consists of the cities of Keego Harbor, Orchard Lake Village and Sylvan Lake have 
stated in their cooperation contract that each city will contribute exactly one third of the 
fire department’s annual budget. 
Property value share includes any cost allocation formula which is based solely on 
proportion or share of SEV, Taxable Values (TV), or requires millage or assessments.  
Property values are easily calculated since the state assesses these figures annually and 
the data are made public.  However, since property values for Villages are not assessed, 
cooperatives that incorporate Villages typically do not use SEV as a method of cost 
allocation, other than a few exceptions.  The basis for calculation in these few exceptional 
circumstances is unknown to the researcher. 
  Fire runs, which also include usage based strategies, are considered to have a 
higher negotiation cost than property values since it is more difficult to collect these data 
and the method requires each fire department to maintain their own accurate records. As 
mentioned above, when using fire runs as a cost allocation mechanism each party has to 
agree to the cost of a fire run.  They must also come to an agreement as to whether each 
call that requires a fire truck should be given the same weight.  For example, the group 
  18needs to decide whether a garbage fire should carry the same weight as a house fire, and 
if not how each should then be weighted.  In general, whether the group uses fire runs or 
percent usage, this methodology is generally difficult to measure and implement. 
  Weighted formulas are the most contractually costly methods since there are more 
variables to decide upon.  The contracting groups have to first decide which variables 
should be included in the formula, some of which may be more difficult to measure, such 
as fire runs, and secondly they need to assign weights to these variables.  In the fire 
cooperatives contained in this database most limited the number of variables to three and 
often included percent of taxable values or SEV, population, and historical usage. 
There were some variables that did not directly fit into these four categories.  One 
such example is when an authority used only population to determine their cost sharing 
formula.  Since population data are readily available from the U.S. Census Bureau, which 
eases the calculations, it was categorized under property values because it is most similar 
to that method.  There were other scenarios where cooperatives assigned unequal 
percents to each municipality, but did not specify how these percents were calculated.  
Under this scenario it is possible that the percents are decided upon by SEV share or by a 
weighted formula.  Since there was no way to determine how the shares were decided 
upon I took the average in difficulty between property values and weighted formula and 
defined it as a fire run.   
A final case is when groups had hybrid cost methods.  In the final database there 
were only 2 such cases and I sorted them into the category which translated to their 
highest cost variable.  For both these cases that variable was fire runs and thus they were 
put into the appropriate category.  Table 2 lays out the distribution of cost allocation 
  19methods among the fire departments included in the analytical portion of the study (i.e. 
these data come from the smaller database rather than the comprehensive one). 
  
Table 2. Distribution of Cost Allocation  
Method in Database 
Allocation Type  # Of Groups  % of Total 
Equal 2  3.6 
Property Value  30  54.5 
Fire Runs  9  16.4 
Weighted Formula  14  25.5 
Total Contracts in Database 55  100.0 % 
 
 
  These four cost allocation mechanisms can be further collapsed into two groups if 
necessary: low transaction and high transaction cost.  Equal share and property value 
share require little effort on the part of participating groups because while the former 
requires no research, the latter requires very little.  These two groups are then best 
identified as low transaction cost.  Further down the spectrum, fire runs or usage based 
and weighted formula allocations both require much more involvement on the part of the 
fire department and are considered a high transaction cost group for reasons discussed 
above. 
    
5.2 State Equalized Value, Taxable Values 
   In 1994, Michigan voters passed Proposal A, which drastically changed the way 
properties were assessed and taxed.  Previous to Proposal A, property taxes were based 
on SEV which is calculated as half of the appraised market value.  However, since 1995 
the Assessor is required to record three values for each property: SEV, the capped value, 
  20and the taxable value.  The capped value is equal to the previous year’s taxable value 
increased by the amount of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) plus any construction 
modifications.  A major impact of Proposal A was that the taxable assessment could only 
be increased by the amount of the CPI at a maximum of five percent.  The taxable value, 
the third value recorded for each property, is the lesser of the SEV and capped value; this 
figure is used to calculate property taxes. 
  Since the dataset includes interlocal agreements previous to 1994, we used only 
SEV data for consistency.  The SEV data would tell us the value of protecting the 
properties and would positively correlate with unequal, formula, or usage based 
allocation formulas.  The larger the degree of difference between SEVs among 
cooperating groups, the more likely a non-equal allocation strategy would be used.  
 
5.3 Vote Sharing 
  Vote sharing information is important to include in the study because the 
conceptual framework suggests that voting power among the cooperating municipalities 
reflects the choice of cost allocation.  In other words, if the costs are based on a weighted 
formula then the final percent contribution by each locality would be proportional to their 
number of board members.  However, this is not the case.  In many of the 
intergovernmental ventures voting is equally weighted among the municipalities, yet, cost 
sharing is variable.  It seems that in most cases board membership in cooperative 
agreements works much like the United States’ taxation and voting system- even though 
an individual pays less in taxes they still deserve a vote that weighs as much as the person 
who pays more. 
  21  Table 3 below shows the breakdown of vote sharing among the fire departments 
included in this study.  Over seventy percent of the 55 total fire cooperatives have 
fireboards with a fixed number of equal representatives from each participating 
municipality.  Thus, each fireboard consists of the same number of appointed or elected 
officials (according to the rule of the agreement) from each municipality regardless of the 
differences in population represented or any other factor.  This also includes the 
possibility that the board elects another member at large.  Other fire departments, over 
sixteen percent, choose to weight representation by some factor, and allow a fixed 
number of members from each municipality that is not equal. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of Vote Sharing  
Method in Database 
Vote Sharing Method  # Of Groups  % Of Total 
Fixed Equal  40  72.7 
Fixed Unequal  9  16.3 
Variable Unequal  1  1.8 
Unknown 5  9.2 
Total Contracts in Database 55  100.0 % 
 
 
5.4 Number of Cooperating Parties 
As the number of cooperating parties increases the more difficult the cost 
allocation decision process becomes.  The comprehensive dataset, which identifies 126 
cooperative fire departments, has an average group size of 3.54.  More cooperating 
parties will increase transaction costs.  Therefore, if larger groups want to avoid even 
higher contractual costs they will opt for a lower cost sharing agreement such as property 
value share.  Figure 1 shows the distribution of fire district size within the smaller testing 
  22dataset, where the average number of participating entities is 3.85, slightly higher than 
the larger dataset average. 
 
 























5.5 Budget Data 
  Following the theory proposed by Gerber and Gibson (2005) wealthy 
communities are less likely to cooperate since they do not have the pressure or incentive 
to do so, especially if political costs are high.  In applying the hypothesis to cost 
allocation, departments that are not fiscally stressed would not be as concerned about 
accurately assigning costs, leading to a higher probability of an equal cost sharing 
agreement.  Wealth, as it is used here, is simply defined as having both a large general 
fund as well as a consistently positive, non-borderline, end of year fund balance. 
  Within the annual audits, higher total expenditures may imply a greater degree of 
integration among the cooperating parties because of the higher risk involved.  This is not 
  23to be confused with the degree of integration discussed above which ranged from 
informal mutual aid to full consolidation.  What I am referring to here is the amount of 
risk and interdependence carried by groups with higher yearly spending, which should 
correlate with the degree of urbanity or rurality.  However, these groups are risking more 
and have more to lose should costs be inaccurately assigned. 
There are two possible perspectives regarding expenditures’ relationship to cost 
allocation mechanisms.  On one hand, groups which have higher total expenditures will 
want to ensure that costs are more accurately distributed to the user and despite the 
additional contractual costs would opt for a user based or weighted formula allocation 
method.  This is one way to reduce risk, especially if collaborating municipalities are 
very different.  On the other hand, with costs already nominally higher, groups may want 
to reduce any further negotiation costs and seek a low transaction cost, particularly 
among similar cooperating groups.  Therefore, if a group has high expenditures and the 
fire department is relatively dissimilar across participants, then the group is most likely to 
adopt a high transaction cost allocation formula.  If on the other hand, the same group has 
a smaller expenditure level then they would theoretically be associated with a less costly 
allocation formula. 
 
5.6 Municipal Size 
  The physical area of the municipalities plays a role in the efficiency and cost of 
service delivery.  The variable chosen to measure this is the total square miles of the 
municipal area as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.  Theoretically, it is not the size of 
the municipalities which matters, but the standard deviation among them.  However, it is 
  24possible that larger areas may also face higher contractual costs when traveling to and 
from meetings.  Additionally, larger areas are correlated with a higher population which 
may further raise contractual costs as more people become involved in the municipality’s 
decision making process. 
 
5.7 Population, Income, and other Variables 
  Population is another variable where similarity in size would imply the adoption 
of a less contractually costly sharing agreement.  Population can often indicate the degree 
of rurality and rural areas are more likely to cooperate (Gerber and Gibson 2005; Feiock 
2007; Krueger and McGuire 2005).  Metropolitan areas experience more difficulty in 
creating interlocal agreements because transaction costs are higher due to higher 
population densities and greater political costs.  This same principle should apply to cost 
sharing agreements. 
  Many more variables are included that follow the same conceptual framework as 
above.  For these municipalities, data from U.S. Census Bureau was available for per 
capita income, median home value, percent of population categorized as white, percent of 
employed residents, percent of those below the poverty line, number of housing units, the 
rate of owner occupied versus renter occupied housing units, and the age breakdown of 
the population.  Additionally, SEV data were collected from the annual assessment 
reports for Michigan.  A pattern of similarity on each of these variables among 
participating municipalities, signaled by a low coefficient of variation, would indicate a 
low transaction cost agreement. 
 
  255.8 Crime Rates and Other Omitted Variables 
  Crime rates are relevant to the decision making process because of the correlation 
of arson and injury with fire and EMS runs.  However, only major metropolitan areas 
record these data and they are only available for the year 2000.  While these data would 
be beneficial to include in the study, lack of congruency makes this impossible. 
  There are many variables, both identifiable and not, which were excluded from 
the dataset.  The type of governance used in each municipality indicates lower 
negotiation costs in cooperation agreements and would likely hold for cost sharing 
agreements.  However, there is no formal record keeping of these statistics on a yearly 
basis and is not included in the study.   Additionally, the share of industry type would 
have an effect on service delivery costs where commercial and industrial buildings 
usually correspond to higher costs.  Again, these data were unavailable for the purpose of 
this study, though their omission may be significant. 
 
6. Methodology and Results 
The main source of data is a database of cooperative fire districts in Michigan 
since the 1980’s.  Information in the database was collected via many sources.  Articles 
of incorporation and other documents retrieved from the Office of the Great Seal were 
used to compose the initial list of cooperative units.  Most of the authorities identified 
were filed under PA 57 of 1988 or PA 7 of 1967.  Information regarding cost allocation 
strategies and vote sharing among the fireboard was also obtained from these documents.  
The audits from the Treasury Department were helpful in supplementing these data while 
also providing the budgetary information included in the analysis.   
  26The remaining variables for this dataset were collected from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  The census data, such as population and demographic characteristics correspond 
to the census year prior to the agreement start date.  For example, if a joint service 
agreement was made in 2004 then the 2000 census data were used since these figures 
would have been used by the fire departments themselves.  For data that were available 
on a yearly basis, such as SEV, figures from the year prior to the agreement were used.  
Thus, for the above example I would have looked at data from 2003.  If the start date for 
the cooperation was not available then I assumed it was created in the average year of all 
the contracts in which I do have data
5.  The average starting year for cooperative 
agreements is 1993, so for annually available data I derived figures from 1992 documents 
and used 1990 census data. 
 
6.1 Two-Step Cluster Analysis 
  The purpose of this study was to find patterns among variables and learn from 
similarities within groups.  The determinants of the various cost allocation formulae were 
not the focus of this study, but rather the factors that are associated with one another 
according to the least number of differences or the most similarities.  To best interpret 
any patterns of cost allocation among the 55 interlocal fire agreements I employed a two-
step cluster analysis.  Two-step cluster analysis is aptly named since it segregates data in 
two steps.  Using the each fire cooperative observation as the unit of analysis, the 
program first segregates the data into preclusters, which are clusters of the original data 
grouped by distance using the log-likelihood criterion.  In the second step, the program 
                                                 
5 The average year was derived from the comprehensive dataset which included all 126 fire cooperatives 
identified in Michigan for this study. 
  27hierarchically groups similar preclusters into the pre-prescribed number of clusters.  Two-
step cluster analysis is thought to work best when each variable is independent, 
continuous and follows a normal distribution, however, the algorithm this works well 
when these conditions are not met (Norušis 2007) 
This method is most appropriate because while it minimizes differences within 
clusters and maximizes the differences between the clusters, it is also the only type of 
cluster analysis that allows for the use of categorical variables as well as continuous 
variables.  This dataset includes three categorical variables: cost allocation, vote sharing, 
and the number of participating entities per cooperative agreement.    Additionally, two 
step cluster analysis does not require any distributional assumptions about the data. 
  The dataset used for testing included 55 observations.  However, the two-step 
cluster analysis eliminates any observations that contain incomplete data.  There are four 
variables in which complete data were not available: vote sharing, and annual revenues, 
expenditures, and end of year balances.  This eliminated 13 additional interlocal 
agreements from the dataset leaving 42 observations for the cluster analysis. 
Since this thesis focuses on comparing the degree of similarities and differences 
between the participants of each fire district observation, coefficients of variation were 
calculated for most variables.  The cluster analysis calculates a mean value for each 
variable where a relatively lower coefficient of variation for a variable would imply that 
the fire districts in that cluster tend to be more similar than in the other cluster.     
Therefore, throughout the analysis, cluster variables for which coefficients of variation 
were calculated are categorized as either similar or different, relative to each other. 
 
  286.2 Data Issues 
  There are several issues that arise with this type of dataset.  First, the timing of the 
events is not fixed.  Not only are the cooperative agreements derived from various, 
inconsistent years but also it is unknown what other factors may have contributed to the 
cost allocation outcome.  The agreement may be directly influenced by the state or 
federal economic conditions for that year, a severe weather pattern that increased the 
need for fire service, or the passage of a bill which encouraged cooperation or effected 
revenue sources.  There are an infinite number of details that cannot be controlled for in 
time series like data. 
  Another data problem derives from the maturation of time.  Older cooperative 
agreements may have altered their cost sharing arrangements in recent years, thus making 
the current method the product of learning from past actions.  However, while we do 
have the start date of most collaborations, this does not necessarily imply that learning 
did or not take place.  On one hand, even with a non-original staff, board members would 
negotiate a new agreement if it appeared to be more financially beneficial than the current 
one.  On the other hand, the costs of negotiation and decision-making are high and many 
boards may opt for the status quo. 
  Additionally, these data are not a random sample nor do they comprise the 
entirety of intergovernmental cooperatives in Michigan.  As reported earlier, the 
cooperating departments in the dataset were collected from two main sources: the 
Department of Treasury audit reports and the articles of incorporation files at the Office 
of the Great Seal.  While more than the 120 were identified, the analysis was only 
performed on interlocal agreements which contained enough information for the study.  
  29In other words, many agreements were identified but their cost allocation strategy was 
not available in the articles of incorporation or their annual audit.   
 
6.3 Variable Selection 
  Once the data were collected, there were over 15 unique variables from which to 
choose for inclusion in the analysis.  Multicollinearity will bias the results of cluster 
analysis and needed to be considered.  Many of the variables I obtained were highly 
correlated and thus most of them needed to be eliminated from the testing dataset.  The 
variables for age composition were highly correlated with most other variables, namely 
population, square miles, and SEV.  Since these variables are more directly involved in 
the cost allocation decision-making process in most cases, age variables were eliminated 
from the dataset but an average population age for each observation was calculated and 
used in its place.  
  Total SEV was also removed as a variable in the analysis despite its inclusion in 
many of the cost allocation formulas.  It was significantly correlated with population, 
employment, and owner occupancy rates.  Instead a SEV per capita figure was 
calculated
6.  This figure intuitively seems to be a better indicator than total SEV since it 
is an average rather than a total amount.  An average value would help to moderate the 
impact of population variances.  SEV per capita was shown to have a much smaller 
correlation with other variables as well.  In the final datasets, all variables were deemed 
to have a small or fair amount of correlation with other variables, if not their inclusion 
was explained below.   
                                                 
6 SEV per capita was simply calculated by using the SEV for all the municipalities in the cost sharing 
agreement and dividing by the total population in all the municipalities. 
  306.4 Test One 
  After carefully eliminating variables from the dataset that may bias results due to 
multicollinearity, I ran the first test using twelve variables: 3 categorical and 9 
continuous.  The analysis distributed 62-percent of the observations to cluster 1 and the 
remaining to cluster 2.  All of the equal cost sharing agreements and those based on fire 
runs were included in cluster 1 as well as 70-percent of those using property value share 
and 18-percent of the groups allocating costs using a weighted formula.  These results are 
summarized in Table 4.   
The results show that at the 90-percent significance level there were no 
statistically significant variables determining cluster 1.  At a 95-percent significance level 
the number of participating entities and the coefficient of variation of median home value 
were significant in cluster 2 as was cost allocation at a 90-percent significance level.  In 
general, cluster 1 consists of mostly lower transaction cost allocation agreements relative 
to cluster 2, where lower transaction cost sharing agreements consist of equal and 
property value share arrangements.  The conceptual framework tells us that cluster 1 
should also harbor more variables that are categorized as similar, referring to a lower 
mean coefficient of variation within that cluster.  With this in mind, we can see in Table 5 
that there are an equal amount of similar variables in cluster 1 as in cluster 2 revealing no 
obvious patterns.  However, we can see that observations in cluster 1 had a higher mean 
year end balance than those in cluster 2 which does correspond to the theory presented 
earlier that wealthier communities will tend towards lower transaction cost contracts. 
 
 
  31Table 4. Frequency of Cost Allocation Agreements  
Between Clusters, Test One 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
Equal 100.0% .0% 
Property Value Share  69.6.0% 30.4% 
Fire Runs  100.0% .0% 
Weighted Formula  18.2% 81.8% 
 
 
Table 5. Summary of Test One Results 









Cost Allocation  -  No   -  No (90%) 
# Of Entities per 
Observation 
- No  - Yes  Categorical 
Variables 
Vote  Sharing  - No  - No 
End of Year Balance ‘06  Larger  No  Smaller  No 
Median Home Value  Different  No  Similar  Yes 
Population Density  Different  No  Similar  No 
Per Capita Income  Different  No  Similar  No 
Poverty Rate  Similar  No  Different  No 
Median Income  Different  No  Similar  No 
% Of White Population  Similar  No  Different  No 
# Of Housing Units  Similar  No  Different  No 
Continuous 
Variables 
Average Age  Similar  No  Different  No 
 
 
Even though few variables are significant between the two clusters, we can still 
learn something from the relative significance of each variable based on a t test at a 90-
percent significance level as displayed in Figures 3 and 4 (see Appendix 1 for variable 
codes).  The coefficients of variation for median home value and median income are the 
top two variables in terms of importance for both cluster 1 and cluster 2, with the order of 
variables changing slightly from that point.  From this, we can infer that these two 
variables are very similar within the two clusters yet very different between the two 
clusters.   
  32The only significant continuous variable, median home value for cluster 2, has a 
low relative coefficient of variation, implying that fire cooperatives in cluster 2 have 
fewer variations between cooperating parties.  In other words, participating municipalities 
have more similar median home values in cluster 2 than in cluster 1 suggesting a possible 
relationship between departments using a weighted cost allocation formula and those 
with similarly valued homes, which contradicts the theory presented.  However, few 
concrete conclusions can be drawn from this test because neither cluster can be 
designated as “more similar” assuming all variables are weighted equally.  If variables 
were weighted according to their importance in cost allocation formulas, where median 
home value, population density, and number of housing units had a higher weight, then 
cluster 2 would be considered more similar, thus contradicting the theory presented 
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The analysis also revealed frequency patterns for vote sharing and the number of 
entities involved.  The summary for vote sharing distribution among the clusters is 
summarized in Table 6.  Cluster 1 contains the majority of the equal vote sharing groups 
as well as the entire unequal fixed and variable vote sharing agreements.  While theory 
tells us that there should be a larger share of equal vote fireboards in cluster 1, the 
prevalence of other vote sharing arrangements does not reveal any obvious patterns 
among this group of observations.   
 
Table 6. Frequency of Vote Sharing Agreements  
Between Clusters, Test One 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
Equal 54.3% 45.7% 
Fixed Unequal  100.0% .0% 
Variable Unequal  100.0% .0% 
  346.5 Test Two  
  As mentioned above, the correlation matrix revealed that many variables were 
significantly correlated.  To correct for this, many variables were eliminated. However, 
some variables were interchangeable, such as SEV per capita and median home value, 
but could not both be included in the dataset.  The next few tests examine the outcomes 
when different, still valid datasets, are used by replacing variables that tend to measure 
the same thing in different ways. 
  Test Two is the same as Test One except for the replacement of median home 
value for an SEV per capita variable.  The correlation matrix revealed that these two 
variables are significantly correlated at the 0.01 level on a two-tailed test.  For the sake of 
this study, it is very possible, and perhaps more likely, that SEV is a better measure to 
reveal cost allocation patterns. 
Tables 7 and 8 below summarize results from this altered two-step cluster 
analysis, where 60 percent of the observations were assigned to cluster 1.  The bolded 
items represent changes from the previous test.   In Test Two, the distribution of cost 
allocation agreements among clusters is similar to Test One except that more groups who 
use a weighted formula are now in cluster 2.  Also cluster 2’s leading significant variable 
is cost allocation methodology at the 95-percent level followed by the number of 
participating entities at the 90-percent level.  Even though SEV per capita was considered 
a substitute for median home value, it did not take its place in regards to its significance 
in cluster determinacy.  Thus when SEV per capita replaced the coefficient of variation 
for median home value, only one collaborative using a weighted formula remained in 
cluster 1 and percent white became an important cluster-determining variable. 
  35Another interesting result from this test is the importance of similarity of the 
percent white within fire districts in cluster 1.  Additionally, there are slightly more 
similar variables in cluster 1 than cluster 2 in this test versus the last one.  Cluster 1 
departments also have a larger year-end balance and a larger SEV per capita, implying 
that this cluster contains wealthier communities.  These results may indicate, as they do 
in Test One, that cluster 1 is wealthier and has a tendency towards contracts with lower 
transaction costs, matching the conceptual framework. 
 
  Table 7. Frequency of Cost Allocation Agreements  
Between Clusters, Test Two 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
Equal 100.0% .0% 
Property Value Share  69.6% 30.4% 
Fire Runs  100.0% .0% 
Weighted Formula  9.1% 90.9% 
 
Table 8. Summary of Test Two Results 









Cost Allocation  -  No   -  Yes 
# Of Entities per 
Observation 
- No  - No (90%) Categorical 
Variables 
Vote  Sharing  - No  - No 
End of Year Balance ‘06  Larger  No  Smaller  No 
SEV per Capita  Larger No  Smaller  No 
Population Density  Different  No  Similar  No 
Per Capita Income  Different  No  Similar  No 
Poverty Rate  Similar  No  Different  No 
Median Income  Different  No  Similar  No 
% Of White Population  Similar  Yes  Different No 
# Of Housing Units  Similar  No  Different  No 
Continuous 
Variables 
Average Age  Similar  No  Different  No 
 
 
  36Figures 4 and 5 below show the results of a t test at the 90-pecernt significance 
level (see Appendix 1 for variable codes).  The relative rank of the variables has changed 
from Test One where now the coefficient of variation for median income is the only 
common variable in the top three for both clusters.  This pattern change may suggest that 
there are now more differences between the two clusters as compared to the results of 
Test One.  Regardless, we can conclude from these results that the coefficients of 
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6.6 Test Three 
  Test Three builds upon Test Two variables by leaving SEV per capita in the 
model and substituting the budget’s year-end balance variable for expenditure data in the 
2006 fiscal year.  These two variables are highly and significantly correlated though they 
measure different parts of the budget.  However, having a high year-end balance may 
imply a lack of financial stress while a high level of expenditures could indicate a higher 
degree of integration and more fundamental uncertainty. 
   
  Table 9. Frequency of Cost Allocation Agreements  
Between Clusters, Test Three 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
Equal 50.0% 50.0% 
Property Value Share  95.7% 4.3% 
Fire Runs  .0% 100.0% 
Weighted Formula  18.2% 81.8% 
  38Table 10. Summary of Test Three Results 









Cost Allocation  -  Yes   - Yes 
# Of Entities per 
Observation 
- No  - No  Categorical 
Variables 
Vote  Sharing  - No  - No 
Expenditures ‘06  Smaller Yes  Larger  No 
SEV per Capita  Larger  No  Smaller  No 
Population Density  Different  No  Similar  No 
Per Capita Income  Similar  No  Different  No 
Poverty Rate  Similar  No  Different  No 
Median Income  Different  No  Similar  No 
% Of White Population  Different No  Similar  No 
# Of Housing Units  Similar  No  Different  No 
Continuous 
Variables 
Average Age  Similar  No  Different  No 
 
Tables 9 and 10 above reveal that including the expenditure variable leads to a 
different pattern in the cluster analysis than in previous tests.  First, we see a different 
clustering based on cost allocation, which is now a significant variable in both clusters.  
Cluster 1 consists predominantly of observations with low transaction cost agreements 
and cluster 2 is just the opposite.  This cluster pattern better parallels the conceptual 
framework that finds equal and property value share cost allocation mechanisms to be 
closer in contractual costs than the remaining two cost allocation choices. 
  Expenditures are a significant variable once added to the analysis, where groups 
in cluster 2 have higher overall mean expenditures, consistent with the theory regarding 
expenditures presented earlier.  Also interesting is that once expenditures were 
substituted into the analysis, per capita income became more similar among low 
transaction cost groups and percent white became more different, contrary to previous 
  39results.  Since both cost allocation and expenditures are significant in determining cluster 
1 we can infer that patterns of similarity exist between these two variables.  
  In Figures 6 and 7 below, results from Test Three reveal that both the top three 
and the bottom three variables are different between the two clusters, but now 
expenditures and the coefficient of variation for number of housing units is important in 
both clusters.  The number of housing units appears to be more varied among the fire 
districts in cluster 2 than in cluster 1, signaled by a relatively higher mean coefficient of 
variation, as well as with poverty rates and average age figures which are also important 
variables in these clusters.  This tends to support the conclusion that fire districts in 
cluster 2, which tend to employ high transaction cost sharing formulas, will have a higher 
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6.7 Cost Allocation Distributions 
  A summary of the change in cost allocation distribution among the two clusters 
and between the three tests is graphed in Figures 2 and 3 below.  These graphs refer to 
the total number of each cost allocation type represented rather than the percent makeup 
of the cluster.  By simply alternating between several similar variables, the number of 
each cost allocation strategy included changed within each cluster, where cluster 1 
always represented a lower transaction cost group and cluster 2 was always relatively 
higher.  The most significant change in cluster composition came with Test Three which 
used an expenditure variable rather than the year-end balance variable and resulted in a 
large change in property value share and fire runs distributed to each cluster. 
 
































  427. Summary and Conclusions 
  The results for the two-step cluster analyses are not conclusive but they do 
provide insight into some possible patterns.  Theory tells us that similar communities, 
those with low coefficients of variation, should be included in cluster 1 which is 
associated with less costly contracting methodologies.  Conversely, fire cooperatives 
exhibiting higher coefficients of variation should be the principal presence in cluster 2.  
Other variables such as expenditures, year-end balances, and SEV per capita, which are 
measured by their mean nominal value rather than a coefficient of variation, should 
follow the principle that wealthier communities will choose less costly transaction 
methods. 
  The conceptual framework was based on identifying groups that shared a higher 
number of similar characteristics and being able to find a pattern among their cost 
allocation choices, however, this was not always the case.  The analyses showed only a 
few significant patterns of similarities and differences between cooperative entities and 
their cost allocation choices.  The most significant patterns clustered cost allocation 
mechanisms and variations between median home value, number of municipalities 
involved in cooperative fire departments, the coefficient of variation for percent of white 
population, and expenditure levels for the fire district.  Results from Test Three most 
clearly paralleled the conceptual framework where the variables most important to 
determining the clusters, both the significant and insignificant ones, were consistent with 
theory. 
However, there are many ways this analysis could have been strengthened and the 
following suggestions should be taken into consideration for future studies.  A small 
  43number of complete observations was a major hindrance in this study.  There were only 
42 usable observations in the end but over 100 have been identified.  Future studies will 
be more conclusive and robust if complete data for these 100 interlocal agreements are 
found.  
There are also other variables that would be valuable to the analysis that were not 
included in this study for various reasons.  Governance, which has been shown to highly 
influence decision outcomes, may be an important omitted variable and if time and 
resources allow data should be collected and included.  Additionally, data on fire runs or 
usage rates by fire departments may help identify if differences in these rates lead to 
usage-based cost sharing methods.  A measure of cooperation prior to the agreement, 
which may indicate that those with higher levels of previous cooperation tend to 
participate in equal cost sharing methods, is also worth considering for inclusion in the 
analysis.  In terms of analyzing test outcomes, weighting variables may help to prioritize 
the variables especially as the dataset grows.  While it may be important to include 
certain variables for statistical reasons they do not always offer much insight into 
patterns. 
  There is value in determining which variables are associated with various cost 
allocation methodologies.  The main policy directive is to promote the cooperation of 
similar groups of municipalities.  These groups have a higher incentive to select low 
transaction cost formulas since the benefit of a higher transaction cost formula is much 
lower than the cost of implementing it.  The hope is that this information can be used in 
conjunction with data on the success and cost savings of these authorities, helping to ease 
negotiation costs in the future.  Internally, cooperative groups can better identify 
  44strategies that offer them the lowest costs of transaction and most savings based on their 
characteristics.  From a statewide perspective, segmenting cooperative group types will 
help target policies to certain groups in order to increase the likelihood of profitable 
collaborations among all types of public services.   
 
  45Appendix 1.  Cluster Analysis Figure Codes 
 
 
  The following table identifies the variable which corresponds to the codes in 
Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 above.   
 
Table 11. Interpretation of Figure Codes 
Figure Code  Variable 
eoy06  2006 end of year balance for the fire unit as 
recorded in the annual audit 
exp06  2006 total expenditures for the fire unit as 
recorded in the annual audit 
sevpcap  SEV per capita based on the year prior to 
the contract start date 
cv_medhv  Coefficient of variation for the median 
home value in the participating units of the 
fire district as recorded by the U.S. Census 
prior to the contract start date 
cv_med_i  Coefficient of variation for the median 
income in the participating units of the fire 
district as recorded by the U.S. Census 
prior to the contract start date 
cv_pct_w  Coefficient of variation for the percent of 
white population in the participating units 
of the fire district as recorded by the U.S. 
Census prior to the contract start date 
cv_avg_a  Coefficient of variation for the average age 
in the participating units of the fire district 
as recorded by the U.S. Census prior to the 
contract start date 
cv_pop_d  Coefficient of variation for the population 
density in the participating units of the fire 
district as recorded by the U.S. Census 
prior to the contract start date 
cv_hu  Coefficient of variation for the number of 
housing units in the participating units of 
the fire district as recorded by the U.S. 
Census prior to the contract start date 
cv_pcain  Coefficient of variation for per capita 
income in the participating units of the fire 
district as recorded by the U.S. Census 
prior to the contract start date 
cv_pov  Coefficient of variation for the percent of 
poverty in the participating units of the fire 
district as recorded by the U.S. Census 
prior to the contract start date 
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Standish Area Fire Authority, Arenac 
1.  City of Standish 
2.  Township of Lincoln 
3.  Township of Standish 
 
The AuGres, Sims, Whitney Fire & Rescue 
Authority, Arenac 
1.  City of AuGres 
2.  Township of Sims 
3.  Township of AuGres 
4.  Township of Whitney 
 
Fowlerville Area Fire Authority, Livingston 
1.  Village of Fowlerville 
2.  Township of Conway   
3.  Township of Handy 
4.  Township of Iosco 
 
Chelsea Area Fire Authority, Washtenaw 
1.  Village of Chelsea 
2.  Township of Lima 
3.  Township of Lyndon   
4.  Township of Sylvan 
5.  Township of Waterloo 
 
ABB Joint Fire Board, Van Buren 
1.  Arlington Township 
2.  Bangor Township 
3.  City of Bangor 
 
Brighton Area Fire Authority, Livingston 
1.  City of Brighton 
2.  Brighton Township 
3.  Genoa Township 
 
Suttons Bay-Bingham Fire & Rescue 
Department, Leelanau 
1.  Suttons Bay Township 
2.  Bingham Township 
 
Sunfield, Sebwa & Danby Fire Association 
District, Eaton 
1.  Village of Sunfield 
2.  Sunfield Township 
3.  Sebewa Township 
4.  Danby Township 
 
Marshall Area Fire Fighters Ambulance 
Authority, Calhoun 
1.  Township of Burlington 
2.  Township of Clarendon 
3.  Township of Convis 
4.  Township of Eckford 
5.  Township of Fredonia   
6.  Township of Lee    
7.  Township of Marshall   
8.  Township of Tekonsha 
9.  City of Marshall 
10. Township of Marengo 
 
Howell Area Fire Authority, Livingston 
1.  City of Howell 
2.  Township of Cohoctah 
3.  Township of Marion 
4.  Township of Oceola 
 
Hartland Deerfield Tyrone Fire Authority, 
Livingston 
1.  Hartland Township 
2.  Deerfield Township 
 
Coloma-Hager Joint Fire Board, Berrien 
1.  City of Coloma 
2.  Coloma Township 
 
Clinton Area Fire and Rescue, Clinton 
1.  Bingham Township 
2.  Greenbush Township    
3.  Victor Township 
 
Lawton Fire Department, Van Buren 
1.  Village of Lawton 
2.  Township of Antwerp   
3.  Township of Porter 
 
Decatur-Hamilton Joint Fire Department, 
Van Buren 
1.  Decatur Township 
2.  Hamilton Township 
 
Tri-Town Fire Department, Oscoda 
1.  Big Creek Township 
2.  Elmer Township 
3.  Mentor Township 
  47South Kalamazoo County Fire Authority,
 Kalamazoo 
1.  Village of Schoolcraft 
2.  Village of Vicksburg 
3.  Township of Brady 
4.  Township of Prarie Ronde 
5.  Township of Schoolcraft 
6.  Township of Wakeshma 
 
GRAAFSCHAP Fire Department, Allegan 
1.  Fillmore Township 
2.  Laketown Township 
 
Caspian-Gaastra Fire Authority, Iron 
1.  City of Caspian 
2.  City of Gaastra 
 
Saline Area Fire Department, Washtenaw 
1.  City of Saline 
2.  Lodi Township 
3.  Saline Township 
4.  York Township 
 
Watervaliet Joint Fire Board, Berrien 
1.  Township of Watervaliet  
2.  City of Watervaliet 
 
Litchfield Fire Department, Hillsdale 
1.  City of Litchfield 
2.  Litchfield Township 
3.  Part of Scipio Township 
4.  Part of Butler Township 
 
Menominee & Ingallston Township Fire 
Department, Menominee 
1.  Menominee Township 
2.  Ingallston Township 
 
Hart Area Fire Administrative Board, 
Oceana 
1.  City of Hart  
2.  Golden Township 
3.  Hart Township  
4.  Weare Township 
 
Quincy Fire Association, Branch 
1.  Village of Quincy 
2.  Quincy Township 
3.  Algansee Township 
4.  Butler Township 
 
Beaverton Area Fire Protection District, 
Gladwin 
1.  City of Beaverton   
2.  Beaverton Township 
3.  Tobacco Township 
 
Caseville Area Fire Protection Association, 
Huron 
1.  Caseville Township   
2.  Lake Township 
 
Addison Fire Department and Emergency 
Medical Service, Lenawee 
1.  Village of Addison    
2.  Township of Rollin 
3.  Wheatland Township  
4.  Woodstock Township  
5.  Village of Cement City 
 
White Cloud Area Fire Department, 
Newaygo 
1.  City of White Cloud  
2.  Township of Everett 
3.  Lincoln Township  
4.  Sherman Township 
5.  Wilcox Township 
 
Chesaning-Brady Fire Administrative 
Board, Saginaw 
1.  Chesaning Township 
2.  Chapin Township    
3.  Brady Township 
4.  Village of Chesaning 
 
Brown City Area Fire Authority, Sanilac 
1.  City of Brown City   
2.  Burnside Township 
3.  Flynn Township 
4.  Lynn Township 
5.  Maple Valley Township 
 
Sandusky Community Fire Department 
Association, Sanilac 
1.  City of Sandusky 
2.  Watertown Township 
3.  Custer Township  
4.  Elmer Township 
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